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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHENANGO FORKS TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16833 
CHENANGO FORKS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JANET AXELROD, GENERAL COUNSEL NEA/NY, for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, LLP, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Chenango 
Forks Central School District (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the District violated 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally directed both the president and 
secretary of the Chenango Forks Transportation Association, 
NEA/NY (Association) that they were henceforth prohibited from 
discussing union business on District property. 
This charge was originally administratively closed but it 
was reopened on consent of the District.-' A hearing in this 
case was conducted by the ALJ later on the same day that a 
-
7The District initially objected to the Association's request 
that the case be reopened, but it later agreed to open the case. 
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hearing in another case involving these parties was held.-7 
Both parties were represented at the hearing by nonattorneys 
without objection by either party. 
The ALJ found that the District had always allowed the 
president and secretary of the Association, both bus drivers, to 
discuss Association business, without restriction, with each 
other and other unit employees while on the District's property. 
As the District's transportation supervisor had unilaterally 
abolished that practice and had, on April 6, 1995, ordered the 
Association president to leave District property when not on 
duty, the ALJ found that the District had violated the Act by 
preventing employees from the lawful discussion of employment 
issues while on District property.-7 
The District's exceptions are taken to procedural issues 
only. The District argues that the ALJ erred by allowing the 
Association to reopen the charge because the Association had not 
filed a second notice of claim pursuant to Education Law §3813 
when the case was reopened, by allowing nonattorneys to represent 
the parties at the hearing in contravention of Judiciary Law, 
§478 and §484, and by not recusing himself pursuant to the 
District's motion. The Association is in accord with the ALT's 
decision. 
27See Chenango Forks Cent. Sch. Dist., 29 PERB f4588 (1996) . No 
exceptions have been filed to the ALT's decision in that case. 
-
7Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 28 PERB ^3080 
(1995) . 
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After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision.-7 
The District's first exception is denied. The District 
agreed to reopen the case and it cannot now argue that the 
reopening was error. By granting its consent to the reopening, 
the District waived any claim that the reopening should have been 
denied. Additionally, we do not read Education Law §3813 as 
requiring a second notice of claim to be filed when a case is 
reopened without prejudice and with the consent of the school 
district,-7 since, by its nature, the reopening of a case can 
only reactivate the original case, as to which the notice of 
claim requirement was met. 
The District's argument under the second exception focuses 
on the nonattorney status of not only the Association's 
representative, but also its own representative. The District's 
argument is apparently based upon the decision of the Supreme 
Court, Albany County in Union-Endicott Central School District v. 
PERB,-7 in which the Court held that a party's timely objection 
-
7The District did not file a brief in support of its exceptions. 
-
7The District apparently relies on the holding of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department in Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist., 214 
A.D.2d 288, 28 PERB J[7013 (3d Dep't 1995). That Court first held 
that Education Law §3813 is applicable to at least some improper 
practice charges in Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 197 
A.D.2d 276, 27 PERB J[7005 (3d Dep't 1994), motions for leave to 
appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 803, 27. PERB 57012 and U[7013 (1994). 
29 PERB f7004 (1996) (appeal pending). 
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to the representation of another party by a nonattorney at a 
hearing required discontinuance of the hearing. 
At the time the hearing in this case was held, the decision 
in Union-Endicott had not been rendered and the AKT proceeded 
with the hearing in accordance with our twenty-eight-year 
practice of allowing nonattorneys to represent parties. There 
was no objection to lay representation raised by the District. 
Further, while it has been held that a party can object to the 
nonattorney status of its own representative at an administrative 
hearing "upon a timely demonstration of prejudice as a result of 
representation by an ineligible practitioner,"-7 here, the 
District has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by its 
election to have a nonattorney represent it at the hearing. 
Indeed, the District has not presented any evidence or argument 
which sets forth the basis for its claim in this regard. Finding 
no basis for it, it is, therefore, denied. 
The District's third exception is that the ALJ erred when he 
failed to recuse himself pursuant to the District's motion. 
PERB's Rules of Procedure, §204.7(h)(1) provide that "except upon 
a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a motion for recusal 
shall be made as soon as reasonably possible after the basis for 
such motion becomes known to the party making it." That rule is 
itself simply a particularized version of our general policy to 
•^Jenkins Covington, N.Y., Inc. v. NYS Dep't of Taxation and 
Finance, 195 A.D.2d 625, 627 (3d Dep't 1993), motion for leave to 
appeal denied, 82 N.Y. 2d 664 (1994). 
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require all motions to be made as soon as reasonably possible.-; 
The District's motion to the ALJ was made more than five 
weeks after the close of the hearing and more than two weeks 
after the.receipt of the transcript in the hearing. . The motion 
was based on the ALJ's conduct of the hearing and it should have 
been made at the hearing or shortly thereafter. The District has 
offered no reasons, either in its motion or in its exceptions, 
for the substantial delay in filing its motion. Therefore, we 
affirm the ALT's denial of the motion to recuse as untimely made. 
In any event, although the District's motion points to 
several instances during the hearing where the; ALJ allegedly 
engaged in conduct which, the District believes, evidences a bias 
against the District and which overstepped the bounds of 
appropriate conduct by an ALJ at a hearing, no transcript 
references were provided. After our review of the transcript, 
however, it appears that most, if not all, of the conduct 
complained about by the District occurred during that part of the 
hearing which constituted the hearing in the other improper 
practice charge,-7 which is not before us and is unrelated to 
the charge under review. If, as the District alleges, the ALJ's 
conduct at the hearing was biased against it, then the District 
would have filed exceptions to the decision in the case that was 
being heard at the time the allegedly egregious conduct occurred. 
^See Town of Brookhaven, 26 PERB J[3066 (1993) . 
^Supra, note 2. 
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It did not file any exceptions in the other case and has filed 
the exceptions in this case, apparently on the basis that the 
bias allegedly exhibited by the ALJ in the first case carried 
over and affected his decision in this case. As noted, the 
District has not clarified in its exceptions what conduct by the 
ALJ it found objectionable, nor has the District provided any 
legal argument in support of this exception. Our review of the 
transcript does not persuade us that the ALJ was biased against 
the District or that any bias affected either the findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. While the ALJ did question a 
witness, our rules provide that an ALJ has the power to examine 
witnesses to ensure a clear and complete record.—7 Such 
questioning becomes inappropriate only when it becomes 
"susceptible to an appearance or perception that the ALJ has 
supported the position of a party",—7 and that is not the case 
here.. Therefore, even were the recusal motion timely made, we 
would affirm the AKJ's denial of the motion for the reasons set 
forth here and in the AKJ's letter response to the motion. 
As no exceptions were taken to the AKJ's findings of fact or 
his conclusions of law, we do not review those facts or 
conclusions. We hereby deny the District's exceptions and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ. 
^
7 R u l e s , §2 0 4 . 7 ( d ) . 
^ C a n a n d a i c r u a C i t y Sch . D i s t . , 27 PERB 5.3046, a t 3100 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District rescind the 
directive of the transportation supervisor which prohibits the 
discussion of union business on school district premises, restore 
the practice which had existed prior to that date, and sign and 
post notice in the form attached in all locations in which 
notices of information for employees in the unit represented by 
the Association are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Chenango Forks Transportation Association, NEA/NY 
(Association) that the Chenango Forks Central School District will: 
1. Rescind the directive of the transportation supervisor which prohibits the discussion of union 
business on school district premises. 
2. Restore the practice which had existed prior to that date. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CHENANGO FORKS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
J 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, MONROE COUNTY 
LOCAL 828, MONROE COUNTY EMPLOYEE UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17227 
COUNTY OP MONROE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BARRY c. WATKINS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Monroe (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Monroe County 
Local 828, Monroe County Employee Unit (CSEA). After a hearing, 
the ALJ held that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
upgrading unit employees employed in the physical therapist (PT) 
and occupational therapist (OT) title series. The ALJ found a 
violation both as to those employees who remained within CSEA's 
unit despite their upgrade and those employees whose upgrade 
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removed them from the unit.-7 The ALT held that the upgrades 
were mandatorily negotiable, that the County had acted 
unilaterally in making those upgrades, that its unilateral action 
was not privileged by any compelling need and that the upgrades 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act on a per se basis because the 
employees received a wage increase as a result. 
The County excepts to what it argues was an impermissible 
expansion of the charge through an amendment granted by the 
conference ALJ. According to the County, CSEA's charge is and 
was intended to cover only the twelve employees whose upgrade 
removed them from the unit. The conference ALJ, however, read 
the charge to include all employees who were given an upgrade and 
the hearing ALJ accepted that reading of the charge. On the 
merits, the County argues that it was not improper for it to 
upgrade employees because that action was not unilateral, rather 
it was an exercise of contract right. The County argues that the 
contract does not restrict its power to allocate positions to 
salary grade, and the upgrades were consistent with rights 
necessarily flowing to it from the contractual definition of the 
bargaining unit, which anticipates the occasional movement of 
employees both within and without the unit according to their 
salary grade. 
-'CSEA represents County employees in grades 16 and below. Of 
the 2 4 employees who were upgraded, 12 were upgraded to grade 17 
and above. 
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CSEA argues in response that the County's exceptions are 
untimely. On the merits, it argues that the scope of the charge 
was correctly determined by both the conference and hearing ALJs 
and that the disposition of the charge on the merits was correct 
on the facts and the law. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we reverse that part of the ALJ's decision finding the 
County in violation of the Act. 
Preliminarily, we must address the timeliness of the 
exceptions and the scope of the charge before us. 
As to the first of these preliminary issues, the County 
received the ALJ's decision on May 23, 1996. June 14, 1996 was 
the last of the fifteen working days available to the County for 
filing exceptions-7 and it filed the exceptions by mail that 
date. The exceptions are, therefore, timely. 
As to the second of the preliminary issues, CSEA did not 
amend its charge at or after the conference and the conference 
ALJ did not grant an amendment. The conference ALJ's letter to 
the parties merely confirmed a clarification of the charge made 
apparent as a result of discussions at the conference. 
Clarification of issues is a main purpose of a pre-hearing 
conference-' and the conference ALJ committed no error by 
confirming CSEA's clarification; nor did the hearing ALJ err in 
2/Rules of Procedure §204.10 (a) . 
5/Rules of Procedure §204.6. 
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accepting that clarification. CSEA represents that its charge 
was always intended to cover all employees who received an 
upgrade, whether or not they were thereby removed from its unit, 
and the charge as filed is reasonably susceptible to that 
interpretation. The hearing ALJ committed no error by addressing 
the charge as filed and clarified. 
As to the merits, the County could have violated the Act as 
alleged only if it had a duty to negotiate the upgrades. Its 
motive for making the upgrades was only to pay Pts and OTs at a 
rate competitive in the marketplace so that it might be more 
successful in attracting and retaining employees in that title 
series and thereby improve its chances of being able to deliver 
PT and OT services to its constituency. The removal of certain 
employees from CSEA's unit was merely a derivative effect of the 
upgrades, not an object or motive for them. CSEA had already 
negotiated the pay rates for the salary grades within its unit 
and there is no allegation or evidence that the County paid those 
employees who remained in the unit at a rate in excess of the 
rate negotiated for any salary grade in the unit. The salary 
rates for employees in grades 17 and above were not subject to 
negotiation by CSEA as the employees in those grades are not in 
CSEA's unit. Therefore, the dispositive merits question becomes 
whether the County's reallocation of unit employees to a higher 
salary grade was mandatorily negotiable. 
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In regard to that merits question, the courts in Evans v. 
Newman-7 (hereafter Evans), and we in response in County of 
Tompkins-7 (hereafter Tompkins), have held that an employer's 
allocation or reallocation of positions to salary grade are not 
mandatorily negotiable subjects. 
Evans reflects a belief that allocations to salary grade are 
primarily related to the mission of a government and are tied 
inherently to the level and quality of a government's service. 
Our contrary conclusion,-7 resting upon the effects all 
allocations to grade have upon an employee's wages, was 
specifically reversed in Evans. In reversing, the Court noted 
the close relationship between allocation and classification, the 
latter a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.- The Court further 
observed that allocation decisions affecting State employees in 
the classified service are specifically exempt from mandatory 
negotiation. The Court in Evans read the legislative reports and 
the memoranda supporting that exemption broadly and concluded 
that the rationale expressed therein was not intended to apply 
only to State employees. Rather, the Court in Evans concluded 
that the legislature had articulated a general policy against the 
required negotiation of allocation decisions to avoid "the 
disruptions of the delicate relationships existing among job 
'^71 A.D.2d 240, 12 PERB 5[7022 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 
904, 13 PERB 17004 (1980). 
^
7Countv of Tompkins, 15 PERB f3092 (1982) . 
^
712 PERB 53 075 (1979) . 
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titles which would result from fluctuations inherent in 
collective bargaining".-7 
To be sure, some of the Court's rationale in Evans is unique 
to the unified court system and legislation applicable only to 
it. It is clear, however, that Evans is not restricted to 
employees of the judiciary. To the contrary, the Board in 
Tompkins read the holding in Evans as one "intended as a general 
statement of the law whose applicability was not restricted to 
the parties to that case".-7 On that basis, the Board in 
Tompkins held that "allocation and reallocation are an essential 
aspect of the level and quality of service to be provided a 
public employer"-7 and that "allocations to salary grade are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiation".—7 
There is nothing in Evans or Tompkins, also involving 
employees of a county government, which distinguishes allocation 
from reallocation, nor is there anything in those decisions 
suggesting that the negotiability of allocation decisions might 
vary, as the ALJ held here, according to either the identity or 
status of the body or officer making the allocation—7 or the 
Z771 A.D.2d at 245, 12 PERB at 7045. 





7Neither Evans nor Tompkins involved an allocation made by a 
civil service commission. Moreover, the County's legislative 
(Footnote cont'd on next page) 
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effects resulting from an allocation. In that latter respect, 
some additional comment is warranted regarding the removal of 
some employees from the unit, as that appears to be a major issue 
for both parties. 
The removal of certain employees from the unit is not a 
factor in assessing the negotiability of the County's 
reallocations. The removal of some employees from the unit was 
effected by the parties7 unit definition. Our analysis is no 
different than if a bargaining unit were to be defined by job 
title. If an employee were hired into a nonunit title, or a unit 
employee were to be promoted to a nonunit title, the hiring or 
promotion decision would not become mandatorily negotiable simply 
because a consequence of the hiring or promotion was to determine 
the employee's unit status. As the County argues persuasively, 
these parties necessarily contemplated through their unit 
definition the possibility, if not the certainty, that employees 
would enter and leave the unit periodically through the exercise 
of some managerial prerogative, whether it be hiring, promotion, 
or reallocation. It is the unit definition in those instances 
which determines any employee's unit status, not the hiring, 
promotion or reallocation. 
(Footnote 11 cont'd) 
body appears to have the power to allocate positions to salary 
grade under County Law §§204 & 205. Indeed, if the reallocations 
were beyond the County legislature's power, review of its action 
would not lie with PERB, for any statutory duty to negotiate 
assumes and is dependent upon the power to act. 
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In regard to that unit definition, nothing in this decision 
should be construed to mean that the former unit positions which 
were reallocated to salary grades 17 and above should not be 
appropriately placed into CSEA's unit. A unit placement 
petition, which may be filed at any time, would be an appropriate 
procedure for determination of that question. For purposes of 
this decision, however, the unit status of any particular 
employee is simply not material to a determination regarding the 
negotiability of a decision to reallocate positions to salary 
grade. 
In conclusion, the County did not violate its duty to 
bargain because the reallocations were not mandatorily negotiable 
subjects under Evans and we are bound by the Court of Appeals' 
decision in that case. The wage increases extended to employees 
were merely an inherent by-product of the.implementation of the 
decision about that nonmandatory subject. The salary increases 
paid were at a rate which was either negotiated by CSEA or one 
which was not subject to mandatory negotiation by CSEA at any 
relevant time. Neither the payment of the wage increases 
stemming automatically from the reallocations nor the removal of 
some employees from CSEA's unit violated §209-a.l(a) on a per se 
basis and those actions were not improperly motivated. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed to the extent it holds the County in violation of the 
Act. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
muA v-~ P\ , 
\ 
r, \K<& Q^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric Jr. Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF BUCHANAN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17427 
BUCHANAN POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
RAINS & P06REBIN, P.C. (JESSICA S. WEINSTEIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
< 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buchanan 
Police Association (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding, as charged by the Village 
of Buchanan (Village), that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
submitted a demand for a nonmandatory subject of bargaining to 
compulsory interest arbitration. 
The Village and the Association were parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement for the period June 1, 1991 through May 31, 
1994. After the parties engaged in negotiations and mediation, 
the Association filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration on December 13, 1995. Included in the Association's 
petition was its demand to "amend Article 3, Section B, to 
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reflect that the officer called-in as a 'floater' can be floated 
for only full (four day) tours of duty."-7 
The Village asserted that the demand was nonmandatory 
because it interfered with its right to determine staffing needs. 
The ALJ concurred, finding that the demand required a floater to 
be on duty a minimum of four days, regardless of the Village's 
need for a floater, and, thus, it interfered with the Village's 
right to determine the number of police officers on duty at a 
given time. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that 
the ALJ erred by categorizing the demand as a manpower demand 
when it is a demand relating to call-in procedures. The. Village 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
-'•'Article 3, Section B of the parties' expired agreement states: 
When the department manpower reaches five (5) rotating 
police officers (including Sergeant), the police 
officer with the least seniority with the Buchanan 
Police Department shall be utilized as a "floater" to 
fill voids in the rotating schedule. 
(1) The "floater" shall be given at least twenty-four 
(24) hours notice on change of scheduled working tours,, 
unless he/she consents to such change on less notice. 
(2) In the event that such "floater" works more than 
eight (8) consecutive hours within a twenty-four (24) 
hour period, said "floater" shall be entitled to 
overtime pay for hours worked in excess of eight (8) 
hours at the applicable rate. 
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While the Association characterizes its demand as setting 
forth the minimum time period during which a "floater" will work, 
likening it to a demand for guaranteed minimum hours of overtime, 
in its brief to the ALT it asserted that the 
proposal would provide that in the event a floater is 
used to fill voids in the rotating schedule, he would 
not only be given the 24 hours notice and the overtime, 
as presently set forth in the contract, but he would 
also be guaranteed a full four-day tour of duty. 
Limited to and based upon the foregoing, the ALJ correctly 
analyzed the demand as one which would require the Village to 
assign a "floater" to a minimum of four days work, whether or not 
the staffing shortage which prompted the "floater" to be called 
in to work in the first place still existed on the second, third 
and fourth days of the tour. Such a demand interferes with the 
Village's management prerogative to determine its staffing needs 
and the deployment of its personnel.-7 While in general demands 
for call-in procedures are mandatory, as are demands for 
guaranteed pay for call-ins, the Association's demand in this 
matter as defined by it is neither. This demand restricts the 
Village's right to determine the number of officers to be on duty 
for any given tour.-7 The Village is not required to negotiate 
g/Troy Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2304, 10 PERB 53 015 
(1977); Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters of the City of Newburgh, 
Local 589, 10 PERB 53001 (1977). . 
^Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n of Newburqh, New York, Inc., 
18 PERB f3065 (1985), conf'd on other grounds, 19 PERB 57005 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1986); Local 589, Int'l Ass'n of Fire 
Fighters, AFL-CIO, 16 PERB 53030 (1983) ; Hudson Falls Permanent 
Fire-Fighters, Local 273 0. 14 PERB 53021 (1981). 
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for a minimum staffing level on any given day irrespective of its 
assessment of its staffing needs. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Association 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting to compulsory 
arbitration the demand above found to be a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation. The Association's exceptions are, therefore, 
denied and the decision of the ALT is affirmed. The Association 
is, therefore, ordered to withdraw the demand from arbitration. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUNKIRK SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4458 
DUNKIRK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
HODGSON, RUSS, ANDREWS, WOODS & GOODYEAR, LLP (JEFFREY 
F. SWIATEK of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case-7 comes to us on exceptions filed by the Dunkirk 
City School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (AKJ) as adopted and confirmed by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director)-7 on a petition filed by the Dunkirk Supervisors7 
Association (Association). 
The Association petitioned to represent two employees: the 
District's School Business Manager/Treasurer and its Supervisor 
of Buildings, Grounds and Transportation (Supervisor BG&T). 
-'This case was originally consolidated with the District's 
application for designation of its School Business 
Manager/Treasurer as managerial or confidential (E-2 016). The 
confidential designation granted as to that title pursuant to 
that application was not appealed. 
-'The decision was issued by both the AKJ and the Director in 
response to a decision by Supreme Court in Union-Endicott Cent. 
Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 29 PERB [^7004 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. March 1996) 
(appeal pending) . In relevant part., the Court held that a 
decision in a representation case must be made by the person who 
conducted the hearing, in this case, the AKJ. 
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After designating the former position confidential and, 
therefore, ineligible for representation in any unit, the 
ALJ/Director determined that a unit consisting of only the 
Supervisor BG&T could not be created because a unit of one 
employee is per se inappropriate.-'' Faced with a question 
regarding the uniting of the Supervisor BG&T, the ALJ/Director 
determined that the title was most appropriately added to an 
existing unit consisting of the District's administrators, a unit 
which is represented by the Dunkirk Administrators' Association 
(DAA).-1 The DAA had moved to intervene in the representation 
proceeding, but it withdrew its motion after the District opposed 
it. DAA has stated, however, that it does not have any objection 
to the inclusion of the Supervisor BG&T in its unit. 
The District excepts to the inclusion of the Supervisor BG&T 
in DAA's unit. It argues that the Supervisor BG&T does not have 
a community of interest with the administrators in DAA's unit. 
The District emphasizes that the Supervisor BG&T, unlike the 
administrators, does not have any involvement with instruction; 
that he has a much more limited supervisory responsibility over 
District employees than do the administrators; that he does not 
^Auburn Indus. Dev. Auth. . 15 PERB [^3039 (1982). 
-
;In addition to the DAA unit, there is in the District a 
teachers unit and a noninstructional unit. The ALJ/Director 
specifically found that it would be inappropriate to place the 
Supervisor BG&T into the noninstructional unit because the 
Supervisor BG&T supervises many of the employees in that unit. 
No specific rationale was given for the exclusion of the 
Supervisor BG&T from the teachers unit. 
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have any employment responsibilities similar to the 
administrators, except as both he and the administrators are 
responsible for the physical maintenance of the District's 
property; that he lacks education or certification qualifications 
in any way similar to those required of the administrators as 
professional educators; and that he has a greatly dissimilar 
salary and benefit package. These differences, the District 
argues, establish the absence of any community of interest 
between the Supervisor BG&T and the administrators and the 
substantial likelihood of a conflict in negotiations were the 
Supervisor BG&T to be added to DAA's unit, either of which 
requires that the Supervisor BG&T not be added to that unit, even 
if that leaves the position temporarily unrepresented. In the 
latter regard, the District emphasizes that the record does not 
establish that the Supervisor BG&T is the only supervisory 
employee in the District who is eligible for representation. 
Therefore, the ALJ/Director's conclusion that the Supervisor BG&T 
would be or might be unrepresented if not added to DAA's unit is 
not supported by the record. No response to the District's 
exceptions has been filed.-7 
-''The Association, by letter we received before the exceptions 
were received, withdrew from the proceeding, stating that it 
would no longer represent the parties (i.e., the two individual 
employees). We do not consider this letter to have been intended 
as a request to withdraw the petition itself, but as the 
Association's withdrawal from its status as representative of the 
employees' interests, a status it apparently considered to be no 
longer necessary or appropriate given the AKT/Director decision. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the exceptions, we 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
The ALJ/Director correctly reached the uniting of the 
Supervisor BG&T, there being a pending representation question 
and no issue regarding his status as a covered public employee. 
They were also justified in expressing a concern about a possible 
deprivation of any covered employee's representation rights which 
might be caused by a uniting determination. Although we also 
believe that deprivation of a covered employee's statutory 
representation rights is a factor that may be considered in 
making a unit determination, this record does not permit a 
determination as to whether the Supervisor BG&T will be denied 
representation if not added to DAA's unit because we do not have 
sufficient information regarding the nature and extent of the 
Supervisor BG&T's supervisory responsibilities and the nature and 
extent of the District's unrepresented supervisory workforce, if 
any. As such, it is appropriate to remand the case to the 
ALJ/Director to enable them to investigate these issues. If. 
there are unrepresented supervisors currently employed by the 
District, the ALJ/Director should assess the appropriateness of a 
unit consisting of nonadministrative supervisory personnel. 
Adding the Supervisor BG&T to DAA's unit or some other existing 
unit in the District might not be most appropriate in that 
circumstance. If, however, the Supervisor BG&T is the only 
currently unrepresented supervisory employee employed by the 
District, then we should know that as a record fact, in addition . 
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to the nature and extent of the Supervisor BG&T's supervisory 
responsibilities vis-a-vis other District employees, before 
deciding which, if any, of the District's existing units might 
appropriately include the Supervisor BG&T. 
For the reasons set forth above, the case is remanded to the 
AKJ/Director for further investigation consistent with our 
decision herein and for such decision as is thereafter necessary 
and appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 25, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
auline R. Kinsella, 
?sS^\A 
Pauline R. Kinse l la , Chairperson 
^ STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREECE SUPPORT SERVICES EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U--1-7-214 
GREECE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
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HAROLD G. BEYER, JR., ESQ., for Charging Party 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Greece 
Central School District (District) to a decision by ah 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed by the Greece 
Support Services Employees Association, NEA/NY (Association). 
On a stipulated record, the ALT held that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it "failed to pay salary increments in 
July 1995", after expiration of the parties' July 1, 1992 through 
June 30, 1995 collective bargaining agreement. The ALT held that 
the parties' expired contract required the District to 
recalculate annually the wage rates for each of the several steps 
in the parties' salary schedules using a cost-of-living (COL) 
formula. By not recalculating the 1994-95 wage rates effective 
July 1, 1995, on a new 1995-9 6 salary schedule, the District, 
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according to the ALJ, both unilaterally changed a mandatory 
subject of negotiation and discontinued a term of the expired 
agreement. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the ALJ was 
mistaken as to the nature of the parties' wage system. The 
District argues that although it must, and did, pay "salary 
increments" by advancing employees one step on schedule annually, 
the COL calculation was a formula only for the calculation of the 
specific wage rates assigned to the steps on the salary schedules 
covering the term of the 1992-95 contract. By creating salary 
schedules for the three years covered by the contract, and by 
adjusting those schedules through application of the COL 
calculation, the District argues that it satisfied entirely all 
of its obligations under the Act by paying on step at the rate 
prevailing under the 1994-95 salary schedule. 
The Association argues in its response that the ALJ was not 
mistaken as to the facts or the law, that her decision is correct 
and that it should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
Our decision in Waterford-Halfmoon Union Free School 
District-7 (hereafter Waterford-Halfmoon) is dispositive of this 
case. There, too, the parties had both a wage system consisting 
of multi-step salary schedules based on years of service and a 
1/27 PERB 53070 (1994) . 
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formula for the calculation of the dollar amounts assigned to 
each of the steps on those salary schedules. We held in 
Waterford-Halfmoon, in relevant part, that the employer did not 
violate the Act when it failed and refused after expiration of 
the collective bargaining agreement to create new salary 
schedules which adjusted the dollar amounts on each salary step 
through the use of a formula. It was our conclusion in 
Waterford-Halfmoon that the parties intended the salary formula 
contained in their expired agreement to be used to calculate the 
dollar amounts assigned to the step schedule only for those 
salary schedules covering the term of their collective bargaining 
agreement and that the record did not establish that they 
intended to require the continuing use of the formula to 
refashion new salary schedules containing ever increasing step 
rates after contract expiration. There is nothing in the record 
in this case to evidence that these parties intended a result 
different from that in Waterford-Halfmoon as to the continuing 
use of the COL calculation. 
The ALJ held that the District had to increase the dollar 
amounts associated with the salary steps by applying the COL 
formula to create new salary schedules for 1995-96 and 
thereafter. As we pointed out in Waterford-Halfmoonf however, a 
formula which is used simply to calculate the dollar amounts 
assigned to any particular step on a salary schedule is properly 
viewed no differently than if the parties had set those amounts 
in advance for the years covered by their contract by a fixed 
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percentage increase or a flat wage increase. Unit employees 
would not be entitled upon expiration of the contract to an 
increase in the wage or salary rate they were paid immediately 
prior to expiration of the contract by an amount equal to the 
salary or wage increase for the last year of the contract because 
it would be clear in that circumstance that the increases in rate 
were intended to be granted during the term of the contract only. 
We find nothing here evidencing an intent to require the District 
after contract expiration to increase annually the rates assigned 
to the steps contained on the 1994-95 salary schedule. 
Waterford-Halfmoon necessitates a determination as to what 
the parties reasonably intended by their agreement to any 
) particular term of their contract. The absence of language 
specifically terminating an obligation is not dispositive. As in 
Waterford-Halfmoon, the most reasonable interpretation of the 
record in this case is that the COL formula was intended to be a 
device to fix the dollar amounts of each step for the salary 
schedules applicable for the years covered by the parties' 
contract. The parties' contract calls for the creation by 
July 1, 1993, of salary schedules for only the three years 
covered by the parties' agreement. The COL calculation is then 
used to adjust those particular schedules. As the District 
argues, linking the COL calculation to specific salary schedules 
evidences that the parties intended that the District would not 
be required to create a new salary schedule for 1995-96 or any 
/ year thereafter. Rather, such new salary schedules, as in 
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Waterford-Halfmoonr would be the product of negotiations for a 
successor collective bargaining agreement. As the parties have 
stipulated that there is no relevant bargaining history, and as 
the language of the agreement itself, reasonably construed under 
our analysis in Waterford-Halfmoon, does not contemplate the 
required creation of new salary schedules after expiration of the 
1994-95 schedule, the District's refusal to create a new salary 
schedule for 1995-96, or any year thereafter, by using the COL 
formula in the expired agreement did not violate the Act. By 
advancing employees on step annually and paying them at the wage 
rates fixed by the 1994-95 salary schedule for the steps to which 
those employees advanced, the District continued unchanged the 
terms and conditions of the unit employees' employment and the 
terms of the parties' agreement. Therefore, there was no 
violation of §209-a.l(d) or (e) of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
:L 
Pauline R. Kinse la, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Marietta Ambra 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing, as deficient, her charge 
against the Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. (AME). 
Ambra alleges that AME violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by not representing her in 
conjunction with disciplinary charges which had been brought 
against her by her employer, the County of Suffolk (County). 
Ambra is a nurse and she was charged by the County with 
improperly administering medications to patients and falsifying 
the recording of those medications. 
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The Director dismissed the charge as deficient upon his 
initial review, concluding that the allegations in the charge as 
amended established at most an initial difference of opinion 
between Ambra and AME regarding the seriousness of the 
disciplinary charges against her. Noting that AME's 
representative offered to provide Ambra with an attorney, 
although its qualified offer was not what Ambra wanted, that she 
declined to follow certain of AME's advice because she disagreed 
with it, and that she elected to retain private counsel to assist 
her because she did not have confidence in AME's representation, 
the Director concluded that the allegations did not evidence the 
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct necessary to 
establish a breach of AME's duty of fair representation. 
According to the Director, even if AME's representatives 
initially miscalculated the seriousness of the disciplinary 
charges and otherwise erred in giving Ambra advice, that could 
not constitute a violation of the Act as a matter of law. 
Ambra's exceptions reiterate the facts alleged to the 
Director and restate her belief that AME did not represent her as 
it was required to do under the Act. Neither AME nor the County 
has responded to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered Ambra's 
exceptions, we remand the case to the Director for further 
processing. 
Ambra's exceptions reflect in one respect a misunderstanding 
of the charge. The only arguable violations of the Act involve 
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AME, not the County. It is quite clear, however, from parts of 
both the charge and the exceptions that Ambra wants us to clear 
her of the disciplinary charges and any other related 
investigations or consequences stemming from those disciplinary 
charges. However, we have no jurisdiction under this charge to 
consider those issues. Those are issues for review in other 
forums, if at all. 
As to the allegations against AME, we disagree with the 
Director's determination that Ambra's charge fails as a matter of 
law to set forth an arguable breach of AME's statutory duty of 
fair representation. Ambra's charge, fairly read with the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences, alleges that AME denied her 
an attorney's representation until shortly before a hearing was 
to be held on the disciplinary charges. According to Ambra, 
AME's representative allegedly told her that an attorney would 
only be provided to her "one-half to one-quarter of an hour" 
before the disciplinary "hearing. That denial of representation 
was allegedly continued and exacerbated when AME's representative 
advised her to plead guilty to the charges and then further told 
her to prepare her own defense by contacting any coworkers who 
could attest to any problems they might have had with the 
County's medication system, even though Ambra allegedly told 
AME's representative that that would not be a good idea, and, she 
alleges, she suffered employment consequences at the County's 
hands for doing as AME advised her. 
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At this stage of the proceeding, we do not know the totality 
of circumstances surrounding the statements alleged to have been 
made by AME's representatives. We have only Ambra's allegations 
without benefit of an answer or hearing which would place those 
statements, assuming they were made, in context. Standing alone 
and unexplained, the statements Ambra attributes to AME evidence 
conduct which we cannot say as a matter of law could not 
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. 
We do not suggest that AME violated its duty of fair 
representation, but hold only that there are sufficient 
allegations of fact set forth in Ambra's charge to require that 
it be processed further. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's dismissal of 
the charge is reversed and the case is remanded to the Director 
for further processing consistent with this decision. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chaii rperson 
Eric J^Schmertz, Membe 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
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UNION-ENDICOTT MAINTENANCE WORKERS 
ASSOCIATION/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-1422 6 
UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
COUGHLIN & GERHART (FRANK W. MILLER of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Union-Endicott Maintenance Workers 
Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO (Association) and the Union-
Endicott Central School District (District). After a hearing, 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissed the Association's 
charge which alleges that the District violated §2 09-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally contracted with a private company to have ballasts 
and lamps in existing fluorescent lighting fixtures replaced, a 
type of work previously done exclusively by the Association's 
unit employees. After rejecting the District's several 
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affirmative defenses,-7 the ALJ held that employees in the 
Association's unit did not have exclusivity over the work in 
question. 
Upon the testimony of Donald Siebert, the District's 
Director of Building and Grounds, the ALJ found that both unit 
employees and the employees of private contractors had previously 
replaced ballasts and lamps in lighting fixtures. The ALJ 
concluded that unit employees had done that work only on an as-
needed basis as part of regular, day-to-day electrical 
maintenance or repair activities. The work in question involved 
the replacement of thousands of ballasts and lamps in existing 
fluorescent lighting fixtures with high efficiency, energy-saving 
lamps and electronic ballasts over several months by the 
contractor under a rebate program offered by the New York State 
Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG). The ALJ concluded that the 
work under the rebate program, although never done in the 
District before, was most closely analogous to the work done by 
private contractors previously in conjunction with major 
electrical projects. As the Association did not have exclusivity 
i/The District alleged that the Association had not satisfied the 
notice of claim requirements under Education Law §3813 or General 
Municipal Law §50-e; that we are without jurisdiction over the 
charge because it "arises out of" the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement; that the charge was untimely filed; that 
the Association had waived by agreement or inaction any right to 
negotiate the decision to subcontract; that unit employees were 
unqualified to do the work performed by the subcontractor's 
employees; and that the parties had negotiated and reached a 
verbal agreement regarding the subcontracting. 
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over the work done by the contractor under the rebate program, 
the ALJ held that the District's decision to subcontract the work 
subject to the rebate program was.not mandatorily negotiable and, 
therefore, its unilateral subcontract of that work did not 
violate the Act as alleged. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's exclusivity 
determination. The District cross-excepts to the ALJ's dismissal 
of some, but not all, of the affirmative defenses previously 
noted and also to the ALJ's failure to find that the 
Association's unit employees do not have exclusivity over any 
electrical work of any type performed under any circumstances. 
Having reviewed the record arid considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
The analysis turns upon the Association's exclusivity over 
the work in question. On that issue, the record shows that unit 
employees have done a wide variety of electrical work over time, 
including ballast and lamp replacement in existing fluorescent 
lighting fixtures. The District, however, has also used 
electrical contractors to perform a wide variety of electrical 
jobs. The contractors were retained principally in conjunction 
with major construction projects, when the particular electrical 
job required specialized knowledge, skills or equipment not 
possessed by the employees in the Association's unit, or when the 
electrical work was of some emergency nature or time was of the 
essence. The replacement of ballasts and lamps called for under 
Board - U-1422 6 -4 
the rebate program, however, did not require any special skills, 
knowledge or equipment and it was not of an emergency nature. 
Although time was a factor because the rebate program was to be 
completed within a set period, there is nothing in the record 
establishing that unit employees could not have completed the 
project within the required timeframe, especially as extended. 
Moreover, Siebert freely admitted that this was work which unit 
employees were fully qualified to do and had done on many 
occasions in the past. 
As most directly relevant to our analysis of the exclusivity 
question, the record shows that the District has used private 
contractors for various electrical lighting projects. These 
projects, however, called for the installation of new lighting 
fixtures and/or the removal and reinstallation of existing 
fixtures elsewhere in the District's buildings in conjunction 
with new construction or rehabilitation or renovation projects. 
We find nothing in this record establishing that a contractor was 
ever retained in the past simply to perform some minor electrical 
work on an existing lighting fixture which was not to be 
disconnected and relocated or replaced. Siebert7s testimony is 
quite generalized.and, as the ALT found, at points seemingly 
inconsistent, and as best we can determine from the record, his 
articulated belief that one or more contractors had occasionally 
replaced a defective ballast in an existing fixture which was not 
to be moved as part of some larger electrical project is not 
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supported by the documentary evidence. It may be, as Siebert's 
testimony suggests, that in wiring a new fixture or in removing 
an existing fixture and rewiring it elsewhere, lamps and ballasts 
occasionally may have been removed and replaced by a contractor. 
We may even assume, notwithstanding our preceding statement 
regarding Siebert's testimony, that on a few occasions a 
contractor may have replaced a defective lamp or ballast in an 
existing lighting fixture. Even upon that testimony, and with 
that assumption, the tasks were done by a contractor, not as an 
end unto themselves, but simply because, as the ALT observed, 
they were necessary to and an integral part of the doing of the 
broader job which involved a number of different, discrete tasks. 
' We have held that a union does not lose exclusivity over the 
work of its unit employees simply because one or more nonunit 
employees has done that same work as an incidental aspect of 
performing a broader function. For example, in Village of 
Malverne,-7 the fact that tree leaves were picked up by nonunit 
employees in conjunction with and ancillary to the performance of 
their jobs, such as cleaning parks or drains, did not breach the 
union's exclusivity over the work involved in collecting and 
removing leaves during an annual autumn leaf pickup program. 
Similarly, in County of Onondagar-x a contractor's performance 
of a laboratory test for syphilis, which was done incidental to a 
2/28 PERB 53042 (1995) . 
: 5/27 PERB 53048 (1994). 
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battery of other tests, which had not been done by unit 
employees, was held not to breach a union's exclusivity over the 
work associated with syphilis testing. 
On this record, whatever ballast and lamp replacement any 
contractors have done for this District in the past was merely a 
minor and incidental aspect of a broader electrical project. As 
the ALJ found, and the record confirms, there is no time that an 
electrical contractor has been retained by this District just for 
the purpose of replacing ballasts and lamps in existing lighting 
fixtures. As in Malverne and Onondaga, the occasional and 
incidental performance of the tasks in issue under this charge by 
electrical contractors in the past as a necessary part of the 
completion of the project for which those contractors were 
retained did not breach the exclusivity the Association otherwise 
had over the performance of that work. 
Our conclusion that the work done by electrical contractors 
in the past did not breach the Association's exclusivity over 
ballast and lamp replacement in existing fixtures still leaves us 
with the question, however, as to whether the Association has 
established exclusivity over the work done under the rebate 
program. We turn now to that question. 
In concluding that the Association did not have exclusivity 
over the work done under the rebate program, the ALJ considered 
the circumstances under which the Association's unit employees 
had done the work and found that they had not done the work in 
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circumstances comparable to that involved under the rebate 
program. We agree with the ALJ that the circumstances under 
which work is done can be relevant to an exclusivity 
determination. Indeed, in Malverne and Onondaga,, we specifically 
looked to the circumstances in which nonunit employees had done 
the work which had allegedly been transferred improperly. If we 
are willing to examine work performance circumstances for 
purposes of determining whether a union's exclusivity has been 
preserved, the circumstances of work performance must be equally 
relevant in assessing whether exclusivity over certain work has 
ever been established. Although accepting the ALJ's articulation 
of this principle, we disagree with her application of it. 
J The ALJ held that the most the record would support would be 
an exclusivity by the Association's unit employees over ballast 
and lamp replacement when that work was done on an as-needed 
basis as part of normal maintenance or repair activities-7 and 
that the contractor's work was not of that type. The 
circumstance the ALJ used in assessing the Association's 
exclusivity clearly reduces itself to the number of ballasts and 
lamps to be replaced. That is not reasonable in our opinion 
because the circumstance the ALJ used in denying the Association 
exclusivity over this work has nothing to do with the nature of 
the tasks performed. 
-
7The ALJ noted specifically, however, that she was not deciding 
whether and to what extent the Association had established and 
, maintained exclusivity within even that perimeter of unit work. 
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We have held that a discernible boundary-7 to unit work 
cannot and should not be based upon factors which are not related 
to the performance of the job. For example, in City of 
Buffalo,-7 we rejected the union's argument that its unit work 
should be defined in reference to geographic location because 
that factor was wholly unrelated to the nature of the tasks 
performed. Just as geographic location was irrelevant to 
exclusivity in City of Buffalo because it was not task related, 
so, too, is the number of lamps and ballasts replaced unrelated 
to task. We cannot in this case use as a factor to defeat the 
Association's exclusivity a factor which we have declined to use 
to preserve a union's exclusivity. What was irrelevant in City 
of Buffalo cannot become relevant or dispositive here. 
The work required to replace ballasts and lamps in existing 
lighting fixtures, and the skills necessary therefor, are 
precisely the same regardless of the number of fixtures involved. 
The only difference between what the Association's unit employees 
did in the past and what the contractor did under the rebate 
program is the number of ballasts and lamps replaced. Rather 
than a few on any given day, there were thousands to be replaced 
over a period of several months. We do not find persuasive an 
-'The creation of a discernible boundary can permit a union to 
retain exclusivity over work although it would not have 
exclusivity without that boundary. 
^24 PERB ^3043 (1991). Accord County of Erie. 28 PERB J[3053 
(1995). 
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exclusivity determination which rests upon nothing more than the 
number of ballasts and lamps to be replaced. A project requiring 
nothing of a contractor but the doing of more of exactly the same 
which unit employees have done historically is no basis, in our 
opinion, for a determination that a union lacks exclusivity over 
the work of that project. 
The ALJ's conclusion that the work under the rebate program 
was somehow different enough from that done by the unit employees 
to deny the Association exclusivity over that work also fails to 
consider the purpose of that program as it relates to the work 
done in the past by unit employees and contractors. The ballast 
and lamp replacement done in the past by unit employees was for 
that express purpose only. Replacement was the end goal of their 
work. That was not so for any contractor, to whatever limited 
extent their work necessitated the removal of a lamp or ballast. 
Contractors were not retained just for the purpose of replacing a 
lamp or a ballast. They were retained for different reasons and 
their limited work on a lamp or ballast was merely incidental to 
the completion of that other work. The purpose of the rebate 
program was simply ballast and lamp replacement and that was 
identical to the purpose of the work done by the unit employees, 
but not the contractors. 
Our conclusion that the Association had exclusivity over the 
work done by the contractor on the rebate program would be the 
same even if we were to use the ALJ's approach. If, as the ALT 
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held, "as needed" is the circumstance defining the Association's 
exclusivity, then the District's determination that its existing 
ballasts and lamps "needed" replacement because they were 
inefficient satisfied that criterion. The work done under the 
rebate program also fits that part of the ALJ's. analysis 
restricting the Association's exclusivity to maintenance work on 
lighting fixtures. The concept of maintenance is certainly broad 
enough, we believe, to include not only the replacement of broken 
parts within an existing fixture, but preventive maintenance on 
that fixture as necessary or appropriate, in the District's 
estimation, to avoid the expenditure of resources in the future. 
If the District, for example, wanted for whatever reason to 
replace the functioning lamps and ballasts in a single existing 
fixture or all of the lamps and ballasts in the existing fixtures 
in a single room, it is inconceivable to us that that work could 
not be claimed by the Association's unit employees exclusively. 
We are again, therefore, asked to deny the Association 
exclusivity simply on the ground that there were not a few lamps 
and ballasts which the District wanted to replace, but a great 
many. As stated previously, we do not consider it reasonable to 
base an exclusivity determination solely and simply upon the 
number of tasks to be performed where the tasks themselves and 
the qualifications necessary to their performance are identical 
whether the work is done by a contractor or a unit employee. 
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Our reversal of the ALT's exclusivity determination 
necessitates our consideration of the District's cross-
exceptions . 
In its cross-exceptions, the District argues that the ALJ 
erred in dismissing its notice of claim, timeliness and waiver 
defenses. We affirm the dismissal of each. 
As to the notice of claim and timeliness defenses, the 
District argues that the refusal to bargain charge accrued for 
purposes of both Education Law §3813 and the Act in September 
1992, not, as the ALJ held, in mid-November 1992 when the 
District's board of education issued a resolution accepting the 
contractor's bid and awarding it a contract. The District's 
accrual argument is based upon the public meetings held by the 
District's board of education during which the rebate project was 
discussed and approved. The District's argument, however, fails 
as a matter of law. In Odessa-Montour Central School District v. 
PERB,-/ the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that a 
board of education's formal resolution awarding a contract to a 
private contractor was a lawful legislative action which could 
not give rise to a refusal to bargain charge. According to the 
Court, executive implementation of that legislative action was 
necessary to trigger a refusal to bargain charge, which 
implementation occurred when the subcontract was executed by the 
superintendent or the superintendent's agent. 
z/
 A.D. , 29 PERB f7009 (3d Dep't 1996). 
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The charge and notice of claim are both timely even when 
accrual is measured from mid-November 1992. Under Odessa-
Montour , the accrual of this improper practice charge was even 
later than the mid-November 1992 date selected by the ALT. The 
notice of claim and the charge itself are, therefore, clearly 
timely under Odessa-Montour. Moreover, and wholly apart from the 
holding in Odessa-Montour, we would find the notice of claim and 
the charge timely for the reasons stated by the AKJ. 
Similarly, we affirm, for the reasons stated in the ALJ's 
decision, the holding that the notice of claim was properly filed 
and served based upon the holding in Deposit Central School 
District v. PERB.S7 
The District's waiver defense was also properly denied by 
the AKJ. We affirm on this issue again for the reasons stated in 
the ALJ's decision and add a brief comment regarding the 
District's assertion that the Association's failure to protest 
the subcontract untii early December 1992 induced it to contract 
with the electrical company for the work under the rebate 
program. There is nothing in this record which would lend any 
support to a claim that the District relied to its detriment upon 
the Association's silence and would not have subcontracted but 
for that silence. Just the opposite, it is clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt that the District's agents never believed that 
5/214 A.D.2d 288, 28 PERB 57013 (3d Dep't 1995), leave to appeal 
denied, 88 N.Y.2d 866, 29 PERB ^7007 (1996). 
Board - U-14226 -13 
the Association had any right to negotiate the decision to use a 
contractor on the rebate program. In accordance with that 
belief, the District never put the Association on notice of its 
intent to subcontract, it never requested the Association's 
position on that question, or offered it an opportunity to 
negotiate, as was its responsibility. As evidence of its belief 
and intent, the District's response when first questioned by the 
Association's president regarding the subcontract was that the 
work to be done was not the Association's and that the District 
could not afford to pay unit employees to do it. In entering 
into the subcontract, the District relied on those beliefs alone, 
not on anything the Association did or did not say or do. 
We have in conjunction with our discussion and disposition 
of the merits addressed and rejected the District's claim that 
the Association does not have any exclusivity over any electrical 
work of any kind under any circumstances. Without deciding 
whether and to what extent the Association may have exclusivity 
over any other type of electrical work, it has exclusivity over 
the simple lighting tasks performed by the contractor under the 
rebate program. 
In short, we are presented with an economically motivated 
decision which the District believed, albeit incorrectly, was its 
to make unilaterally, without any showing that unit employees 
were incapable of doing the work within the timeframe set for 
completion under the rebate program. In that latter regard, unit 
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employees could have been reassigned by the District, they could 
have worked overtime, existing staff could have been supplemented 
by temporary hiring of employees into the unit, or the work 
required might have been performed by existing staff at straight 
time over an extended period of time upon application to NYSEG. 
In addition to these options, which the District could have 
exercised unilaterally, there were many others possible under an 
agreement negotiated with the Association. The District elected 
not to use the options available to it in its managerial 
capacity, instead choosing to disregard its statutory bargaining 
obligation, a choice which deprived both it and the Association 
of any opportunity to bargain for an arrangement which could have 
avoided this charge and the accompanying litigation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are granted and the ALJ's dismissal of the charge is 
reversed. The District's cross-exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from subcontracting or otherwise 
transferring from the Association's unit the work of 
replacing ballasts or lamps in existing fluorescent 
lighting fixtures unless that work is done only as an 
incidental aspect of an electrical project. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages or benefits 
lost as a result of the contracting for ballast and 
lamp replacement under the New York State Electric and 
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Gas Corporation's rebate program, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Post Notice in the form attached in all locations at 
which notices of information to the Association's unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Union-Endicott Maintenance Workers Association/NYSUT/AFT/ 
AFL-CIO (Association) that the Union-Endicott Central School District will: 
1. Not subcontract or otherwise transfer from the Association's unit the work of replacing 
ballasts or lamps in existing fluorescent lighting fixtures unless that work is done only as an 
incidental aspect of an electrical project. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages or benefits lost as a result of the contracting for 
ballast and lamp replacement under New York State Electric and Gas Corporation's rebate 




UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
b) y other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15360 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION), 
Respondent. 
HITE & CASEY, P.C. (KEVIN CASEY of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the State of New York (Department of 
Environmental Conservation) (State) and Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (Council 82) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) on Council 82's charge against the State. Council 82 
alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied individual 
Environmental Conservation Officers (ECOs) an opportunity to work 
more than seven holidays per year and changed existing work 
schedules to effect that result. 
After a hearing, the ALT sustained the charge. In finding a 
violation, the ALT dismissed as inapplicable the State's 
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jurisdiction and waiver defenses, both of which are based upon 
provisions of the parties7 collective bargaining agreement. The 
ALJ found a change in DEC Region 4's practice regarding holiday 
work and scheduling and she issued a remedy applicable to the 
ECOs in that geographic region only. 
The State excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the charge is 
within our jurisdiction. It argues that the parties' contract is 
a source of right to Council 82 with respect to the subject 
matter of the charge. On the merits, the State argues that the 
ALJ mischaracterized the practice Council 82 had to prove, that 
any practice which may exist embraces a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because it involves only the State's management right 
to set staffing levels, and that, if any practice found to exist 
embraces a mandatorily negotiable subject, Council 82 waived by 
agreement any right to negotiate the changes it made in the ECOs' 
holiday/work schedules. 
Council 82 excepts only to the remedy. It argues that the 
remedy should extend to all ECOs in all of DEC's several 
geographic regions. In response to the State's exceptions, 
Council 82 argues that the ALJ's decision is correct and should 
be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we remand on the jurisdictional and waiver issues. 
ECOs are regularly scheduled to work on certain of the 
twelve paid holidays designated by the parties' agreement. 
Workdays, including holidays, are reflected on a duty schedule. 
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The ECOs' days off are called pass days and these days are 
reflected in a separate schedule. If an ECO works a holiday, the 
ECO may opt for an extra day's pay at straight time or bank eight 
additional hours of vacation accrual. 
In January 1994, the Captain of DEC'S Region 4 announced to 
Region 4 ECOs that they could not work more than seven holidays a 
year. At least two Region 4 ECOs were directed to take off from 
work a holiday which they had been scheduled to work. At least 
one ECO's duty schedule was revised to indicate that he would not 
work certain holidays originally scheduled as his workdays. 
The jurisdictional issue raised by the State concerns our 
power to entertain this charge. In that regard, it is axiomatic 
that we may only exercise the powers which have been bestowed 
upon us by the Legislature. In relevant respect, the 
Legislature, in §205.5(d) of the Act, provided that the Board 
"shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee organization and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such agreement that 
would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice". We have held repeatedly that §205.5(d) 
of the Act is triggered if the provisions of an unexpired 
collective bargaining agreement constitute a reasonably arguable 
source of right to a charging party with respect to the subject 
matter of the improper practice charge.-7 Recognizing that it 
is sometimes unclear, even to the parties to the contract, 
-
7See, e.g. , County of Nassau, 23 PERB 53051 (1990) . 
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whether the contract is a source of right to a charging party, we 
several years ago adopted in Herkimer County BOCES-7 (hereafter 
Herkimer) a jurisdictional deferral policy. Under that policy, 
if there is a pending contractual grievance alleging that the 
respondent's actions which are the subject of the improper 
practice charge violated the parties7 collective bargaining 
agreement, then we will defer our determination of the 
jurisdictional issue necessarily raised by the filing of the 
contractual grievance until the grievance procedure has been 
completed. Disposition of the jurisdictional issue can then be 
made by us, as necessary,-7 in light of the final determination 
on the grievance, which will usually reveal whether the contract 
terms are applicable and, if so, whether they have been violated. 
Section 15.3 of the parties7 agreement is captioned "Shift 
Changes" and provides as follows: 
(a)No employee shall have his shift schedule 
changed for the purposes of avoiding the payment of 
overtime, unless he has been notified of such change 
one week in advance of the time in which the changed 
work period is to begin provided, however, that the 
circumstances necessitating such change are foreseeable 
prior to such one-week period. 
(b)In the event that circumstances necessitating 
such shift changes are not foreseeable, then such 
notice shall be given as soon as possible. 
(c)In the event such notice of shift change is not 
given at least 48 hours prior to the starting time of 
the scheduled shift which the employee is directed to 
work such employee shall not be deprived of the 
2/20 PERB 53050 (1987) . 
-
7A jurisdictional deferral results in the conditional dismissal 
of the charge. The jurisdictional issue is presented to us only 
on a motion to reopen the charge. 
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opportunity to work his normal shift and to be paid 
overtime for the hours worked in excess of 4 0 hours in 
the workweek. 
(d)Employees who compete in New York State Civil 
Service examinations and whose shift ends less than 
eight hours before the starting time of such an 
examination shall not be required to work that shift 
and such absence shall not be charged to accrued leave 
credits. 
(e)Except as otherwise provided herein, regularly 
scheduled days off shall not be changed for the purpose 
of avoiding the payment of overtime. 
(f)Prior to the making of a final decision with 
respect to instituting a charge in shift system from 
fixed to rotating shifts or rotating to fixed shifts 
the Employer shall inform the Union of such 
contemplated change and provide the Union with an 
adequate opportunity to review the impact of such 
change with the Employer at the appropriate level. 
The ALJ determined that §15.3 of the contract was 
inapplicable to the ECOs because one witness at the hearing 
testified that ECOs do not work shifts. . However, the record is 
also clear that many grievances have been filed either by or on 
behalf of ECOs since January 1994, the date the alleged 
unilateral change in holiday/workday scheduling practice was 
made, claiming that the State's change in the ECOs' work 
schedules violated §15.3 of the parties' contract. These 
grievances, however, were not introduced into evidence and the 
testimony did not reveal the exact nature of these grievances. 
The simple fact that contractual grievances regarding 
changes in ECOs' work schedules have been filed under §15.3 
raises substantial questions both as to whether Council 82's 
charge is within our jurisdiction and whether application of our 
jurisdictional deferral policy would be appropriate. 
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Section 15.3 cannot simultaneously be wholly inapplicable to the 
ECOs as the ALT found, and yet be the basis for grievances 
alleging that changes in their work schedules violated their 
contract rights. As the State succinctly but correctly puts the 
point, Council 82 "cannot have it both ways". If any of the 
approximately fifty §15.3 grievances filed since January 1994 
involve changes in an ECO's pass day/work day schedule, then a 
jurisdictional deferral under Herkimer is plainly reguired. In 
the event that none of those grievances involves the subject 
matter of this charge, then we must still decide whether we have 
jurisdiction over it. The very filing of the §15.3 grievances 
shows that the contract is not necessarily inapplicable simply 
because ECOs do not work a traditional "shift". Section 15.3 may 
well be broad enough to cover all unit employees' work schedules, 
even those of ECOs who do not work a traditional shift. Without 
the grievances, we cannot make an informed decision as to whether 
to defer consideration of the jurisdictional issue arguably 
raised by the §15.3 grievances or, if Herkimer is inapplicable 
because none of the grievances filed involves the scheduling 
changes in issue under this charge, whether we in fact have 
jurisdiction over this charge. Those decisions are ones we have 
to make. 
The ALT essentially concluded that there was not enough 
evidence before her on the jurisdictional/deferral issues to make 
a decision on those issues, that it was the State's obligation to 
introduce that evidence, and, because it was missing from the 
record, a merits determination was permissible and reguired. 
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These jurisdictional issues are not, however, affirmative 
defenses. They concern our very power to proceed with an 
investigation of a charge and the manner in which the existence 
of that power is decided and exercised. Substantial questions 
are presented on the existing record as to whether we have 
jurisdiction over this charge and whether consideration of that 
issue is properly deferred under our established policy. 
Disposition of those issues was required before addressing the 
merits of the charge as filed. Only receipt of the grievances 
can resolve the substantial jurisdictional/deferral issues which 
are presented by the §15.3 grievances themselves. Once, as here, 
a substantial question concerning jurisdiction was presented on 
the record; it became incumbent upon the ALJ to obtain the 
grievances to enable her to make a fully informed decision on the 
jurisdictional/deferral issues. 
It is also clear that a remand is necessary for possible 
reconsideration of the State's waiver defense. The ALJ dismissed 
the State's waiver defense, in relevant part, only on her finding 
that §15.3 of the parties' contract is inapplicable to the ECOs. 
The ALJ did not otherwise address the merits of the State's 
argument. As the preceding discussion reveals, however, the ALJ 
could not determine whether §15.3 is applicable without the 
grievances. Upon remand, should the case not be jurisdictionally 
deferred under Herkimer, and should it be determined that the 
charge is within our jurisdiction to hear because §15.3 is not a 
reasonably arguable source of right in relevant respect to 
Council 82, it may still be that §15.3 is applicable to the ECOs' 
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work schedules. The ALJ would then have to decide whether the 
State has the contractual right to change the ECOs' holiday/work 
schedules in the manner and for the reasons the schedules were 
changed in this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, the case is remanded to the 
ALJ for the introduction of the §15.3 grievances filed by or on 
behalf of ECOs, for the conduct of such hearing as may be 
necessary to that end, and for such decision thereafter as is 
appropriate. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
LEWISTON, NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4514 
TOWN OF LEWISTON (POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Benevolent 
Association of Lewiston, New York has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time 
nonsupervisory certified 
police officers employed by 
the Lewiston, New York Police 
Department. 
Excluded: Employees of the Police 
Department in the rank of 
Corporal or higher. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent 
Association of Lewiston, New York. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 25, 199S 
Albany, New York 
mX— tK^L, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4544 
ONEIDA-HERKIMER SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4544 
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Unit: Included: Solid Waste Management Worker; Solid Waste 
Management Laborer; Clerk Typist; Principal 
Account Clerk; Maintenance Mechanic; 
Maintenance Mechanic Welder; Supervising 
Landfill Operator; Landfill Operator; HME 
Operator/Vehicle Operator; Heavy Equipment 
Mechanic Foreman; Vehicle Mechanic; Baler 
Operator; Sorter; Electrical Technician 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENE COUNTY DEPUTIES' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4557 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greene County Deputies' 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
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settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time deputy sheriffs (criminal) and 
deputy sheriff sergeants (criminal). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Greene County Deputies' 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4567 
VILLAGE OF LYNDONVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Local 264 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the 
Public Works Department 
Excluded: Superintendent of Public Works and all other 
employees 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Local 2 64. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 25, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
